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TAKING AUSTERITY TO THE STREETS:  
FIGHTING AUSTERITY MEASURES OR AUSTERITY STATES * 
Bert Klandermans and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg† 
We present data on eighteen demonstrations against austerity politics. A distinction is made 
between demonstrations against the austerity measures governments are taking (11) and 
demonstrations against the governments that are taking these measures (7). In total, 3434 
demonstrators completed a survey questionnaire inquiring about demographic characteristics, 
social and political embeddedness, mobilization channels, satisfaction with the way democ-
racy works in their country, identification and motivation. We propose a theoretical frame-
work for the comparison of participants in the two types of demonstrations. Employing 
anovas, manovas, and logistic regression analyses hypotheses derived from the theoretical 
framework are tested. With a proportion of correct classifications of 75.6% our model was 
able to satisfactorily account for the differences between the two types of demonstrations. 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, many European governments embraced 
austerity politics in an attempt to master the financial crisis. However, they failed to persuade 
many citizens, as numerous people did not want an emaciated austerity state (Offe 2013).  
Relatedly, they did not want to pay for the failures of capitalism. A “movement of crisis” 
(Kerbo 1982) swept across Europe. Consequentially, we have witnessed over the last decade a 
dramatic rise in the number of street demonstrations, as citizens took to the streets to com-
municate their indignation, anger, or worry about the performance of their politicians (Kern, 
Marien, and Hooghe 2014; Likki 2014; McAdam, Simpson, Weffer, and MacIndoe 2005; 
Rüdig and Karyotis. 2013b). People lamented that, rather than protecting them from the 
economic recession, politicians were shifting the burden of the crisis to the people.  
As one would imagine, people differed in the way they responded to the adverse circum-
stances (Wright 2001). Many never responded, but those who did took diverging routes. Some 
demonstrated against a specific austerity measure that affected them personally, as when 
students rejected an increase in tuition fees or when public health workers fought budget cuts 
on health care. For others, the financial/economic crisis turned into a political one. They 
demonstrated against the governments that took austerity measures, pointing to the political 
mismanagement of the crisis and questioning the government’s legitimacy and its com-
mitment to democracy. Examples include Occupy London, Occupy Amsterdam, and May 15 
in Spain, when protesters claimed that the power should be taken from corrupt and incom-
petent politicians and given to the people. “We are the 99%” challenges politicians to listen to 
the people and to take their claims seriously. “We are the people that politicians claim to 
represent, but we do not feel represented or listened to,” people seem to say. Usually, studies 
of demonstrations compare participants with nonparticipants, meaning scholars generally 
know how participants differ from nonparticipants, but this comparison overlooks how par-
ticipants in street demonstrations are a mixed bag of people (Verhulst 2011).  
This article focuses on participants in demonstrations reacting to austerity politics. We 
compare demonstrations against the measures governments take, which we call particularistic 
demonstrations, with demonstrations against the governments themselves, or universalistic 
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demonstrations (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977, Verhulst 2011). Scholars have 
argued that the two types of demonstrations are fundamentally different, having different 
motives, employing disparate mobilization mechanisms, and bringing divergent crowds into the 
streets (Anduiza, Cristancho and Sabucedo 2012a, 2012b; Likki 2014; Milkman, Luce and 
Lewis 2013; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a). However, these theorized differences have not been 
tested systematically. Particularistic demonstrations attract people affected by the austerity 
measures. Usually, these demonstrations are staged by interest organizations such as labor 
unions. Obviously, these organizations play a central role in staging the protest event. We 
hypothesize that the universalistic demonstrations against the austerity state are fundamentally 
different than demonstrations against austerity measures. The crowds populating anti-state 
demonstrations are more diffuse, much more diverse, but above all rallying behind more 
fundamental claims and broader grievances. People are upset about how they are governed, and 
the financial crisis made their grievances more salient. They are the governed who rise against 
their government. Unlike demonstrators against austerity measures, demonstrators against the 
austerity states question the legitimacy of the government. Although we focus here on austerity 
politics, the particularistic-universalistic distinction applies more generally to protests against 
measures authorities take versus protests against the authorities taking those measures.  
We propose a theoretical framework for comparing participants in these two types of 
demonstrations. We expect that these types of demonstrations attract different people, thus 
bringing separate crowds into the streets (who?), for different reasons (why?), and mobilized in 
a different way (how?). Research questions like these require comparative studies of participants 
in the two types of demonstrations, but most studies of protest events are either single case 
studies or global surveys Single case studies are not comparative by design, while global sur-
veys do not collect data regarding participation in individual demonstrations. 
The Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation (the CCC project) offers a 
dataset of over 15,000 individuals participating in a variety of street demonstrations, thus 
allowing us to address such comparative puzzles. Between 2009 and 2013 we surveyed citizens 
who populated street demonstrations in eight European countries, building a unique dataset of 
over 80 demonstrations. Some were ritual parades such as Pride events, women’s marches, or 
May Day parades. Others were typical of new social movement events addressing such issues as 
anti-nuclear energy, anti-fascism, peace, or anti-racism. For this paper we are especially inter-
ested in comparing anti-austerity demonstration directed at austerity measures to those directed 
at the governments imposing such measures. How are they different in terms of gender, age, 
education, and employment status? Are they socially and politically embedded in different 
ways?  Are they differentially mobilized?  Does their evaluation of how democracy works in 
their country vary? Does their motivation to participate diverge?  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Participation in protest events is determined by supply factors, among others. One such supply 
factor is the configuration of organizers. Following Marije Boekkooi, Bert Klandermans, and 
Jacquelien van Stekelenburg (2011), we hold that the specific configuration of organizers in-
fluences the composition of the crowds in the street. Demonstrations against austerity measures 
are similar to traditional “bread and butter” protests staged by formal interest organizations such 
as labor unions or student associations (Verhulst 2011). Verhulst characterizes such protests as 
particularistic. People who feel that their interests are threatened take to the streets to defend 
their rights and to fight against the decline of their situation. Members of these organizations 
more likely encounter mobilization attempts. Also, as these organizations have contentious his-
tories, their members are more likely experienced demonstrators (Beyeler and Kriese 2005; 
Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a; Verhulst 2011). On the other hand, demonstrations against the 
austerity state, are what Milkman and Shalev (2014) named occupy-type protests. These protests 
are about dashed hopes and uncertain futures. People who believe that the state itself fails to 
protect its citizens occupy public space to express their indignation. Anti-state demonstrations 
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are more inclusive and diverse, rooted in loosely coupled networks with weak collective 
identities and a limited capacity for coordinated action (Anduiza et al. 2012a; Beyeler and Kriesi 
2005; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013a; Rüdig and Karyotis 2013b; Verhulst 2011). Verhulst char-
acterizes these protests as universalistic, that is, addressing issues that concern whole popu-
lations or large segments of a population and involving grievances with moral, cultural, and 
lifestyle issues (de Moor 2016). Hence, the two types of demonstrations evolve from a different 
supply of protesters. Both managed to bring substantial numbers into action. We presume that 
such variation in supply factors reflects in who is taking part, how participants are mobilized, 
and why they are protesting.  
Who is Taking Part? The Demographics of Contention 
We expect to replicate the findings reported  in the literature.1 Such a replication would con- 
firm the validity of our data. We presume that participants in demonstrations against the aus-
terity state are usually part of the precariat (Jiménez 2013; Standing 2011), meaning they are 
younger, more highly educated, and in a more precarious employment status than participants in 
demonstrations against austerity measures. No consistent findings were reported regarding gen-
der, which raises questions about what the gender composition of the two crowds will be.  
How Are the Demonstrators Socially and Politically Embedded? The Networks of Contention 
A basic factor in the explanation of protest participation is social and political embed-
dedness. How are people embedded in the formal and informal, social and political networks of 
their society? Anti-austerity demonstrations presumably build on more formal interest organi-
zations, and we expect participants in these demonstrations more than participants in anti-state 
demonstrations to be embedded in the networks of the organizers and the formal organizational 
fields of their society. In contrast, we expect participants in demonstrations against the austerity 
state,to be less embedded in formal organizations and more in loosely coupled networks (Rüdig 
and Karyotis 2013a, 2013b). As for political embeddedness, we expect both types of demon-
strators to be leaning toward the left (Hutter 2014). As their grievances are more fundamental, 
we expect participants in anti-state demonstrations to be more politicized. Therefore, we expect 
them to engage more often in political activities. As they espouse more fundamental objections 
to the austerity state, we expect them to be more involved in political debates as well (Rüdig and 
Karyotis 2013a, 2013b). In our study of Greek anti-austerity demonstrations, we found that 
close to a quarter of the demonstrators in Greece were participating for the first time in a street 
demonstration (2013a). We called those participants “apprentice demonstrators.” Likewise, we 
expect more first-timers for the anti-state demonstrators than for the anti-measures demon-
strators, because we assume that the latters’ embeddedness in traditional interest organizations 
may have led them to protest in the streets before. As anti-measures demonstrators are older than 
anti-state demonstrators, this might in part also be an age-effect.  
How Were the Demonstrators Mobilized? Collective versus Connective Action. 
The occupy-type demonstrations that characterize our anti-state demonstrations are frequently 
organized as Facebook events (Anduiza et al. 2012a; Anduiza et al. 2012b; Langman 2013). 
Bennet and Segerberg (2012) make a distinction between collective and connective action, 
referring respectively to actions that are mobilized via organizational networks and to actions 
that are mobilized via the Internet (using Facebook, Twitter, and the like), largely without 
organizations (see also Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, Damen, van Troost, and van Leeuwen 
2014; Walgrave and Wouters 2014). Demonstrations opposing the austerity state are examples 
of occupy-type demonstrations. Participants in this type of demonstration are less embedded in 
formal organizational networks. Therefore, we expect them to be more likely mobilized with the 
virtual networks potential participants are embedded in rather than organizations, while on the 
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other hand, anti-measures demonstrators are more likely mobilized through the traditional 
organizational networks in which they are embedded.  
Why Did People Take to the Streets? Confronting Austerity Measures or Austerity States 
What motivates people to participate in a demonstration, and how does that motivation differ for 
the two types of events analyzed here? In an attempt to further specify the dynamics of demand, 
van Stekelenburg (2006; also Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk 2011) proposed a 
model integrating various approaches in the social psychological literature (Duncan 2012; 
Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 1998; van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach 2004).  
At the root of protest events lay shared grievances (Rucht and Neidhardt 2002). The more 
people are aggrieved about some state of affairs, the stronger their demand for protest. A 
distinguishing grievance between anti-measure demonstrators and anti-state demonstrators is 
people’s dissatisfaction with democracy in their country. Employing European Social Survey 
data, Braun and Hutter (2014) show that citizens who distrust representative political institutions 
are more likely to take part in nonelectoral forms of political participation such as street dem-
onstrations (see also Gaidyte, Muis, and Klandermans 2015). Also using ESS-data, Dalton et al. 
(2009) show that dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in their country prepares 
people more for participation in collective action. In our comparison between anti-measures and 
anti-state demonstrators, we presume that dissatisfaction with the way democracy works is 
stronger in demonstrations against the austerity state than in demonstration against specific 
austerity measures, as the former are upset about the way politics is done in their country. 
A central mechanism in van Stekelenburg’s model is identification. In order to develop 
shared grievances and to act collectively, a collective identity must develop (Duncan 2012; 
Reger, Myers, and Einwohner 2008; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000). Demonstrations op-
posing austerity measures are examples of single-identity protests.  A single-identity protest 
mobilizes in response to measures that affect a specific group of citizens (i.e., workers, females, 
students, pensioners). The austerity measures themselves define a collective identity, as identity 
politics breeds politicized identities (Klandermans 2014; Verhulst 2011) even more so if identity 
organizations like unions, student groups, or women’s organizations are staging the event, which 
is typically the case for anti-measures demonstrations.  
Demonstrations against the austerity state, on the other hand, are instances of multiple 
identity protests that refer to broadly defined social categories (e.g., Spanish citizens opposing 
capitalism, or Italians opposing Berlusconi). Mobilization campaigns for these events must not 
only mobilize people but must also forge collective identities. As mentioned, we expect that 
participants in anti-measure demonstrations are more likely to be embedded in identity 
organizations such as labor unions and student associations, for example. Therefore, we expect 
to find higher levels of identification with these organizers and with the other participants 
among the anti-measures demonstrators than among the anti-state demonstrators.  
Shared grievances are at the root of politicized collective identities (Simon and 
Klandermans 2001). As anti-measures demonstrators are protesting against the same concrete 
austerity measures, we expect them to have a stronger sense of shared grievances. We assume 
that this will translate into stronger identification with other participants. The awareness that 
interests and/or principles of a group people identify with are violated are turned into motivation 
to participate in collective action by framing procsess (Snow and Benford 2000; Snow, Burke, 
Worden, and Benford 1986). We assume that this motivation can be instrumental and/or 
expressive (van Stekelenburg et al. 2011). Instrumental motives are based on the expectation 
that participation may help to redress the grievances, and people participate to defend their 
interests. Expressive motives, on the other hand, strive to express people’s indignation and to 
raise public awareness. Both types of motivations feed into readiness to participate. If people 
develop a strong readiness to participate, an appealing supply of protest suffices to bring people 
into the streets. Participants in anti-austerity demonstrations share indignation about austerity 
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politics. In our view, particularistic demonstrations against austerity measures are collective 
actions to defend the interests of specific groups, while universalistic demonstrations against the 
austerity state are staged to appeal to more broadly defined protest potentials. Therefore, we 
expect anti-measures demonstrators to be pushed by instrumental motives rather than expressive 
ones and anti-state demonstrators by expressive motives rather than instrumental ones. 
We expect participants in universalistic demonstrations against the austerity state, compared 
to participants in particularistic demonstrations against austerity measures, (1) to be younger, 
more highly educated, and in more precarious employment statuses; (2) to be less embedded in 
organizer networks and formal organizational fields and more embedded in loosely coupled 
social networks; (3) to be equally leaning to the political left; (4) to engage more in political 
activities and debates; (5) to be more often mobilized without organizations; (6) to identify less 
with the organizers and the other participants; (7) to be more dissatisfied with the way democracy 
works in their country; (8) to be more expressively motivated than instrumentally. 
METHODS 
The results come from data collected for a study of street demonstrations (the CCC study).1 We 
selected demonstrations covered between November 2009 and November 2012 that related to 
austerity politics or to the way governments handled the financial crisis. Eighteen demonstra-
tions in four countries (Belgium, UK, Spain, and Italy) qualified2. Eleven clearly aimed at 
specific austerity measures. Table 1 lists these protests and their main slogans. The remaining 
seven demonstrations addressed the quality of the government in the light of the financial crisis. 
Table 2 presents these seven demonstrations together with their main slogans. 
Table 1. Anti-Austerity Measures Protests 
 
Protests Main Slogans 
4.  March for Work, Brussels, 
Belgium, Jan. 29, 2010 
More jobs for young people and the unemployed; no more state aid to 
companies without conditions on the retention and creation of jobs. 
18. Against new labor law, Santiago de 
Compostela, Spain, June 30, 2010 
Against government cutting measures; show my rejection of the lowering 
of dismissal, Show my rejection of welfare cuts 
20. No to Austerity, Brussels, 
Belgium, Sept. 29, 2010 
Protest economic crisis; fixing the crisis must be paid for by the banks, not 
workers; the government should invest in green and renewable energy 
22. Against Labor Law, Madrid, Spain 
Sept 29, 2010 
Against government-cutting measures; against government’s labor reform; 
fixing the crisis must be paid for by the banks and corporations, not workers 
25. Fund Our Future: Stop Education 
Cuts, UK, November 10, 2010 
The cuts in spending on higher education; defend students’ and university 
staff’s rights; secure accessible higher education for future generations 
27. 2nd Student National Demon-
stration, London, UK, Dec. 9, 2010 
Protest spending cuts in higher education; defend students’ and university 
staff’s rights; secure accessible higher education for future generations 
36. TUC’s March for Alternative,
London, UK, March 26,  2011 
Jobs, growth, justice; give a national voice to all affected by public ser-
vices spending cuts; we reject that there is no alternative to spending cuts. 
41. General Strike, Florence, Italy, 
May 6, 2011 
Against government socioeconomic policies; in favor of workers rights 
and social justice 
42. Nonprofit Demonstration,
Brussels, Belgium, Mar. 29, 2011 
The government must urgently agree with the nonprofit sector on a new 
social plan; wage and work conditions in the nonprofit sector have to rise 
52. Defend Our Rights, Vigo, Spain, 
May 1, 2011 
For employment reforms, not capital; protest employment insecurity and 
welfare cuts; show rejection of labor reform and the welfare cuts 
55. We have alternatives, Brussels, 
Belgium, Dec. 2, 2011 
Current economic problems, Eliminating the public deficit has to be done 
by raising new revenues, not by austerity measures; the automatic indexing 
of wages and social allocations has to be preserved 
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Table 2. Anti-Austerity State Protests 
Protests Main Slogans 
7. Against the Europe of Capital, 
Crisis and War, Barcelona, Spain, 
Jan., 28, 2010
Unemployment and precariousness; job and wealth apportionment; less 
work so we can all work; stable jobs with no precarious conditions and a 
minimum monthly wage 
11. Take Back Parliament, London, 
United Kingdom, May 15, 2010 
Unfair voting system; a fair voting system so Parliament properly 
represents the British people; a proportional electoral system that ties a 
party's share of seats to its share of votes across the country 
37. Not in Our Name, Brussels, 
Belgium, May 7, 2011 
 It is necessary to secure solidarity between both parts of the country; 
politicians negotiating unity for the country must mitigate their points of 
view. 
51. Real Democracy Now! Madrid, 
Spain, May 15, 2011
Empowering citizens in decision-making policies; require a new policy 
that reflects the popular interest and not that of a minority. We are not 
commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers! 
56.  Occupy London, London,  UK, 
Nov. 12, 2011 
Unsustainable social system and the lack of social justice, Achieving 
social justice and real democracy. A future free from austerity measures 
77.  No Monti Day, Rome, Italy, Oct. 
27, 2012 
Protest against austerity measures put forth by the Monti government; for 
another Europe 
79.  Joining forces for another Europe, 
Florence, Italy, Nov. 10, 2012
Building another Europe from below; joining social forces at a European 
level to the crisis and the policies imposed by the EU institutions and the 
ECB; creating alliances to build a social Europe, the European citizen 
Sampling Demonstrations 
At the start of the project, we did not know what to expect in terms of demonstrations. 
Between 2009 and 2012, each national team of researchers was to study between eight and 
twelve demonstrations with at least 3,000 participants. Naturally, our sample of demon-
strations is not a random sample. In some countries we covered nearly all demonstrations that 
occurred during our period of fieldwork, while in other countries we had a convenience 
sample of the demonstrations staged. On the whole, we contend that our eighteen demon-
strations provide a realistic picture of the anti-austerity demonstrations in those days.  
Collecting Data and Sampling Participants 
The protest surveys employed printed questionnaires. (We handed out 500-1000 at the 
demonstration with prepaid envelopes for returning completed questionnaires to the univer-
sity. In order to control for response biases, we also conducted short (2-3 minutes) interviews 
with a subsample of the respondents (n = 100-200) at the demonstrations using questions 
identical to those in the printed questionnaire. For the face-to-face interviews, The refusal rate 
was low (on average ten percent). By comparing the answers in the face-to-face interviews 
with those given on the questionnaires, and by comparing the face-to-face interviews of those 
who returned their questionnaire with the interviews of those who did not, we can make fairly 
accurate estimates of the response bias. In total 3,434 participants returned the questionnaires 
distributed during the demonstration (1,974 from measures-demonstrations and 1,460 from 
state-demonstrations). The response rates varied between fourteen and fifty-one percent 
between demonstrations, with an average of twenty-seven percent. Comparing those who did 
and did not return the questionnaire revealed that those who did return it were on average 
somewhat older and more highly educated than those who did not. The analyses we conducted 
to assess whether the nonresponse could have resulted in biased findings and conclusions did 
not reveal any deviating outcomes.  
We designed a sampling strategy such that each participant had the same likelihood of 
being selected. Although circumstances inevitably necessitate variation, we aimed to keep 
sampling procedures as identical as possible across demonstrations. A team covers each 
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demonstration, consisting of a fieldwork coordinator, three or four pointers, and twelve to 
fifteen interviewers. Each pointer works with a team of four to five interviewers. The pointers 
select the interviewees, while interviewers conduct the interviews and hand out the ques-
tionnaires. Separating these two roles appeared to be crucial in preventing sampling biases 
(Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars 2012). As interviewers tend to select people they believe 
to be willing to cooperate, they end up producing biased samples. The fieldwork coordinator 
oversees the employment of the pointer-interviewer teams. At the start of the event the 
coordinator makes an estimate of the number of participants. This defines the rate at which 
interviewers approach people to ask for interviews and to hand out questionnaires. In 
demonstrations that move through the streets, teams start at different points of the procession 
and work towards each other, approaching every Nth person in every Nth row. At demon-
strations that stay in the same area, the space is divided into smaller areas; in each area a 
pointer considers the density of the crowd when selecting interviewees. We believe this 
sampling method leads to a representative sample of the demonstrators present.  
Measures 
All questionnaires and procedures are standardized. Identical questions and indicators 
(translated and back-translated) are employed in each country and for each demonstration. 
For our demographic measures, we ask about sex, age, education, and employment status. To 
measure social embeddedness, we asked participants in how many different organizations 
they had actively participated during the last twelve months (none, one, two or three, more 
than three). In addition, we asked each person if they were a member of one of the organi-
zations staging the demonstration. 
For political embeddedness, we used the classical “left-right self-placement” scale (0 = 
left, 10 = right). Furthermore, respondents received a list of nine different activities (ranging 
from contacting a politician to using violence) and were asked to mark if they had engaged in 
any such activities. For the current analyses, we counted how many different activities our 
respondents checked (ranging from zero to nine). Moreover, we asked, “How many times has 
[someone] taken part in a demonstration in the past twelve months?”  (never, 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, 
more than 20). Finally, we assessed “How often does [respondent] discuss politics with their 
friends, relatives or fellow workers” (never, rarely, sometimes, fairly often, very often). 
To capture satisfaction with democracy, we adopted the following question from the
European Social Survey: “In general, how satisfied are you with the functioning of democracy 
in your country?” Answers ranged from zero (very dissatisfied) to ten (very satisfied). 
We also distinguished between identification “with any organization staging the demon-
stration” and identification “with the other people present at the demonstration” (not at all, not 
very much, somewhat, quite, very much). The two forms of identification correlated (.48), but 
because the pattern of correlations of these two with other variables was significantly different. 
we kept them separate. Finally, in order to assess what motivated the participants to take part, 
we asked them to agree or disagree with various reasons to participate. We offered them two 
reasons related to instrumental motivation (“defend my interest” and “pressure politicians”) 
and two reasons reflecting expressive motivation (“express my view” and “raise public 
awareness”), with participants indicating if they strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor 
disagree, agree, or strongly agree. We collapsed the four into a measure of instrumental and a 
measure of expressive motives (each ranging from 2 “not at all motivated” to 10 “very much 
motivated”).  
Data Processing 
We assessed the characteristics of the participants in the two types of demonstrations by 
means of crosstabulation and one-way anovas and manovas with type of demonstration as 
factor and demographics, social and political embeddedness, mobilization channels, identi-
fication, motivation, and emotions and (dis)satisfaction with the political system as the 
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dependent variables. We included independent variables group-wise in the anovas and 
manovas, in order to limit the loss of cases due to missing values. Next, we conducted a 
logistic regression analysis with the type of demonstration as the dependent variable and 
demographics, social and political embeddedness, identification, (dis)satisfaction with the 
political system, and motivation as the independent variables.  
RESULTS 
On the whole, as predicted, the first type of demonstration relates to concrete austerity 
measures while the second refers to the general working of politics, including austerity 
politics. The former were frequently organized by labor unions, whereas the latter were staged 
by loose coalitions. Table 3 provides the country breakdowns. In the remainder of the article 
we discuss and present data on the following five different matters and test whether the 
participants in the two types of demonstrations differ in terms of (1) democratic characterstics; 
(2) embeddedess in social and political networks; (3) mobilization trajectories; (dis)satisfaction 
with democracy, and (5) motivation to take to the streets.  
Table 3. Respondents and Type of Demonstrations by Country: Number of Participants/Number 
of Demonstration 
Anti-austerity Measures Anti-austerity State Total 
United Kingdom 456/3 494/2 950/5 
Belgium 639/4 202/1 841/5 
Spain 644/3 427/2 1071/15 
Italy 235/1 337/2 572/3 
Total 1974/11 1460/7 3434/18 
Demographic Characteristics 
We begin our comparison with the demographic characteristics of the participants: 
gender, employment status, age, and education  (table 4). Available evidence made us expect 
that participants in demonstrations against the austerity state are in a more precarious em-
ployment status, younger, and more highly educated than participants in demonstrations 
against austerity measures. This is what our data confirm, albeit in varying degree. 




Female 45.3% 44.7% 𝜒2 (1)=0.12ns
Employment status:	  
  Full-time  57.9% 40.1% 𝜒2 (1)=106.6*** 
  Part-time 13.8%   9.7% 𝜒2 (1)=13.33*** 
  Self-employed   3.0% 10.1% 𝜒2 (1) =73.5*** 
  Unemployed   5.3%   9.4% 𝜒2 (1)=21.7** 
  Student   9.9% 13.6% 𝜒2 (1)=11.3*** 
Year born 1967 (13.5) 1968 (15.7) F(2)=6,6** 
Education (tertiary and higher) 46.9% 71.1% 𝜒2 (7)=222.97*** 
N 1974 1460 







We had no expectations with regard to gender, as the literature is inconsistent. In our 
sample we found no significant difference in the gender composition of the two types of 
demonstrations. We note that anti-state demonstrators appear to have a more precarious 
employment status. More of them are self-employed, unemployed, or students facing an 
uncertain future. Two-fifths have a full-time job compared to three-fifths of anti-measures 
demonstrators. Participants in anti-state demonstrations are somewhat younger than those in 
demonstrations opposing austerity measures, although the differences are small. Anti-state 
demonstrators are much more highly educated than anti-measures demonstrators. In the 
literature the term “precariat” (precariado) was coined to designate this new class of people in 
precarious socioeconomic circumstances: highly educated, but with an uncertain future  
(Standing 2011). Demonstrations against the austerity state more often drew their participants 
from this new class.  
 
Social and Political Embeddedness 
 
What about embeddedness in social and political spaces (table 5)? How are the two types of 
demonstrators embedded in the social and political networks of their society?  
As expected, participants in anti-state demonstrations appear to be less involved in the 
multiorganizational fields in their societies than participants in anti-measures demonstrations. 
Rather than being underrepresented in specific types of organizations, they are consistently less 
involved across the spectrum of organizations in Western societies. We found large differences 
regarding participants’ affiliation to the organizers. Almost three quarters of the anti-measures 
demonstrators were members of at least of the organizations that staged the demonstration 
versus a quarter of the anti-state demonstrators.  
 
 
 Table 5. Social and Political Embeddedness: Mean and Std. Deviations and Cross-Tabulations 
 
 Anti-austerity measures Anti-austerity state Significance 
Involvement in org. fields (0 - >3) 2.36 (.95) 2.26 (1.03) F(1)=9.09*** 
Affiliation to organizer  70.9% 25.2% 𝜒2 (1)=659.39*** 
Left-right self-placement (0=left, 
10=right) 
2.52 (2.34) 2.29 (2.27) F(1)=7.87** 
Political activity (0-9) 3.95 (1.92) 4.27 (1.79) F(1)=22.08*** 
Talking politics (1-5) 3.72 (.85) 3.94 (.80) F(1)=52.24*** 
Novice demonstrator 12.4% 24.4% 𝜒2 (4)=26.78*** 
N 1813 1325  
 
Participants in the two types of demonstrations differ in terms of political embeddedness as 
well. In terms of ideological self-placement, our evidence corroborated the general observation 
that participants in street demonstrations are leaning toward the political left (Hutter 2014), with 
austerity state demonstrators identifying as even more left-oriented than anti-measures demon-
strators. As expected, anti-state demonstrators are politically more active than anti-measures 
demonstrators. Moreover, they talk more often about politics with friends, relatives, and col-
leagues than do the anti-measures demonstrators. They are thus more politicized than their 
counterparts and, interestingly, they are more engaged in politics despite lower levels of 
embeddedness in civil society. As expected, more participants in the anti-austerity state demon-
strations took part for the first time in a street demonstration than did participants in anti-
austerity measures demonstrations.  
In general, it seems that the people demonstrating against the austerity state were less 
embedded in social networks but more embedded in political networks than those demonstrating 
against austerity measures. This finding runs counter to Putnam’s (2000) assertion that lower 
social embeddedness results in less political activity.  
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Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) distinction between collective and connective action ap-
plies to the distinction between anti-measure and anti-state demonstrations. As mentioned, 
collective action refers to actions that are mobilized in a traditional manner via formal organi-
zations, while connective action refers to actions that are mobilized without organizations via 
the Internet (Facebook, Twitter, and the like). We characterized demonstrations opposing 
austerity measures as collective action and demonstrations opposing the austerity state as 
connective action. On those grounds, we expected anti-state demonstrations to mobilize more 
often without organizations, using the virtual networks participants are embedded in to recruit 
people. On the other hand, we expected Demonstrations against austerity measures to more 
frequently employ formal organizations to mobilize participants. The small proportion of the 
participants in anti-state demonstrations who are members of any of the organizations that 
staged the demonstration makes us expect these demonstrations to be typical examples of 
connective action—mobilization without organization. The much larger proportion of anti-
measures protesters affiliated with the organizers suggests that these demonstrations are ex-
amples of collective action—mobilization via traditional organizational networks. 
 
Table 6. Communication Channels 
 Anti-austerity measures Anti-austerity state  
Mass media 
   Radio, television 25.6% 10.4% 
   Newspapers  26.7% 17.9% 
Interpersonal networks 
   Family 11.1% 11.5% 
   Acquaintances 20.3% 27.1% 
Organizational networks 
   Fellow members of an organization 48.5% 22.3% 
   An organization 33.8% 29.2% 
   Advertisements, flyers, posters 31.6% 16.6% 
The Internet 
   Social networks (facebook, twitter) 13.9% 38.7% 
   Online media 18.1% 39.0% 
N 1974 1460 
Note: As respondents could mention several options, percentages do not add up to 100% 
 
Table 6 speaks to this matter. Participants in anti-state demonstrations learned relatively 
frequently about the demonstration via loosely coupled networks (acquaintances) and the Inter-
net, while relatively large proportions of the participants in the anti-measures demonstrations 
learned about the demonstration via traditional organizational networks. In answer to the follow-
up question asking which of those channels was the most important source of information, 
30.1% of the participants in anti-state measures demonstrations mentioned organizations as 
compared to 62.2% of the participants in anti-measures demonstrations. Conversely, the Internet 
was the most important channel for 40.1% of the anti-state-participants compared to 10.1% of 
the anti-measures participants. Hence, in the context of anti-state demonstrations, social media 
are indeed far more important. Organizations still played a role for these demonstrations, albeit a 
far less prominent one compared to demonstrations against austerity measures. Indeed, mobili-
zation for these demonstrations at least partially occurred without organizations.  
 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
In table 7 we present results regarding (dis)satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesized 
that anti-state demonstrations are more likely to attract people who are dissatisfied with the  
 












Satisfaction (0-10) 4.1 (2.58) 2.8 (2.30) F (1)=207.2*** 
N 1919 1415  
 
way democracy works in their country. We reasoned that more than demonstrations against 
austerity measures, demonstrations against austerity states are expressions of dissatisfaction 
with the way politics works in the participants’ countries. Indeed, as expected, in response to 
the question how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country, partici-
pants in anti-state demonstrations appear more negative than participants in anti-measure 
demonstrations. Note, however, that on average the evaluation by both groups of demon-




Anti-austerity measures demonstrations were more often mobilized through organizations 
and anti-state demonstrations more often without organizations. Indeed, many participants in 
the former are members of the organizations that staged the demonstrations. Klandermans 
(2014) refers to membership of identity organizations as organized identities, which are not 
only easier to mobilize, but also more salient. Under such circumstances, we expected higher 
levels of identification with the organizers and the other participants among anti-measures 
demonstrators. Table 8 displays the relevant findings. 
 






Identification w/ organizers (1-5) 3.9 (1.05) 3.8 (1.01) F(1)=5.80* 
Identification w/ other participants (1-5) 4.2 (.78) 4.0 (.83) F(1)=58.82*** 
Expressive motivation (2-10) 8.9 (1.22) 8.9 (1.20) F(1)=1.02ns 
Instrumental motivation (2-10) 8.7 (1.41) 8.1 (1.69) F(1)=117.00*** 
N 1781 1766 3547 
 
Both types of demonstrators show higher levels of identification with other participants 
than with the organizers. Levels of identification were higher among anti-measures demon-
strators In view of the degree of embeddedness of the anti-measures demonstrators this is 
what we expected. 
In terms of the motivation to participate, we expected participants in demonstrations 
against austerity measures to be more instrumentally motivated, as they are on the streets to 
fight concrete austerity measures. Anti-austerity state demonstrations, on the other hand, we 
expected to be more expressively motivated. Table 8 reveals that anti-measures demonstrators 
are significantly more instrumentally motivated than anti-state demonstrators. Moreover, anti-
state demonstrators are far more expressively motivated than instrumentally. However, in 
terms of expressive motivation, the two types of demonstrators are the same, which is not 
what we expected.  
 
Classifying Demonstrators: Multivariate Analyses 
 
Thus far, we have assessed whether participants in the two types of demonstrations dif-
fered in terms of demographics, social and political embeddedness, statisfaction with 
democracy, and motivation. We conducted cross-tabulations, anovas, and manovas with these 
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factors as dependent variables and type of demonstration as fixed factor. In this section, we 
will explore to what extent relations found in the previous analyses appear in multivariate 
analyses. More specifically, we assessed to what extent we can classify correctly in which 
demonstration individual demonstrators participated on the basis of the variables in the equa-
tion. We applied both discriminant analysis and logistic regression analysis, which produced 
similar outcomes.  
Table 9. Austerity Measures Versus Austerity State: Stepwise Logistic Regression 
Correct Classifications Nagelkerke’s R Squared 
Null-model 58.2% - 
Demographics 60.9% .06 
Social embeddedness 72.7% .28 
Political embeddedness 73.0% .30 
Satisfaction with democracy 73.5%  .34 
Motivation 75.6% .40 
The fit measures of the logistic regression analyses summarized in table 9 are satisfactory. 
Whereas the a priori chance that individuals are classified correctly is 58.2 percent, based on the 
full-model 75.6 percent of the participants could be classified correctly, while Nagelkerke’s R2 = 
.40. The increases in correct classifications and R2s indicate that net of the variables already in 
the equation, political embeddedness and satisfaction with democracy did not make much of a 
difference between the two types of demonstrations. However, the demographics, social em-
beddedness, and motivation each come with substantial jumps of the fit indicators, suggesting 
that the two groups of demonstrators are significantly different in terms of demographic charac-
teristics, social embeddedness, and motivation to action.  
The detailed results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in table 10, providing 
a picture of how the two kinds of demonstrators were different. As the anti-measures demon- 
Tab
 
le 10. Austerity Measures Versus Austerity State: Logistic Regressiona
B Wald (df=1) 
Demographics 
   Sex (female = 2) -.08 .59ns
   Year born -.01 2.24ns
   Education .13 15.80*** 
Social embeddedness 
   Involvement in organizations .03 .20ns
   Affiliation to organizers -2.33 379.49*** 
Political embeddedness 
   Left-right self-placement (0=left) .04 3.36+ 
   Political behavior .06 3.02+ 
   Talking politics .24 13.45*** 
Satisfaction w/ democracy 
   Satisfaction w/ democracy -.22 102.65*** 
Motivation 
   Identification w/ other participants -.48 44.62*** 
   Identification w/ organizers .56 83.71*** 
   Expressive motives .14 9.02** 
   Instrumental motives -.28 59.84*** 
N=3434 
Note: a For dependent variable, anti-austerity measures = 1, anti-austerity state = 2; Correct classifications 
75.6%, Nagelkerke’s R2 =.40; 







strations are coded 1 and anti-state demonstrations 2, a positive B means that anti-state dem-
onstrators score higher and the anti-measures demonstrators lower on the variable in point. 
Conversely, a negative B means that the anti-state demonstrators score lower and the anti-
measures demonstrators higher on the variable in point. 
Net of the other variables, level of education is the major demographic discriminator. 
Participants in demonstrations against austerity states are more highly educated than par-
ticipants in demonstrations against austerity measures. Net of other factors, gender and age 
did not make a difference.  
The starkest discriminator in this analysis appears to be membership in one of the organ-
izations that staged the demonstration. The two types of participants are virtually each other’s 
opposites in this respect. The vast majority of the anti-measures demonstrators are affiliated 
with the organizers, while conversely the vast majority of the anti-state demonstrators are 
unaffiliated with the organizers. The differences in social embeddedness observed in the 
manova do not appear here. As for the embeddedness in the organizational field, the two types 
of demonstrators are the same. As mentioned already, net of other factors, political em-
beddedness is of limited weight as a discriminator. Net of the other factors, anti-measures 
demonstrators are more left-leaning, while anti-state demonstrators are politically more active 
and talk more about politics, but the differences are small. In short, participants in the two 
types of demonstrations are equally politicized. 
Satisfaction with the way democracy works in someone’s country retained its original 
link with the type of demonstration. In line with the previously reported findings, satisfaction 
with democracy is lower among anti-state demonstrators. In fact, satisfaction with democracy 
is the second most important discriminating factor in this analysis. 
Motivation remains an important factor discriminating between the two types of demon-
strators. The findings regarding expressive and instrumental motivation corroborate our 
hypotheses and earlier findings: participants in anti-state demonstrations are more expres-
sively motivated and less instrumentally motivated than participants in anti-measures demon-
strations. Net of other factors, participants in anti-state demonstrations identify more with the 
organizers of the demonstration than do participants in anti-measures demonstrations, and less 
with the other participants than do anti-measures demonstrators.  
Further analysis of identification patterns suggests a moderating role of membership of 
organizations that staged the demonstration (table 11). Among members of organizations that 
staged the demonstration, all identity scores were relatively high; among nonmembers, all 
identity scores were relatively low. Both members and nonmembers in anti-measures protests 
identify more with the other participants; however, participants in anti-state demonstrations 
identify more with the organizers if they are members of organizations that staged the demon-
stration and with the other participants than if they are not a member. 
In sum, the two types of anti-austerity demonstrations appealed to different protest poten-
tials and brought different crowds into the streets. Comparing participants in street demon-
strations who protest against the austerity state to participants in demonstrations against 
 
Table 11. Identification by Affiliation to Organizers and Type of Demonstration: Mean and 
Standard Deviations 
 Member Nonmember 
 Anti-measure Anti-state Anti-measure Anti-state 
Identification w/ organizers 4.18 (.86) 4.35 (.74) 3.17 (.112) 3.58 (1.01) 
Identification w/ other participants 4.28 (.75) 4.11 (.77) 4.03 (.80) 3.91 (.84) 
N 1299 336 517 933 
Note: Identification with other participants: main effect affiliation to organizers, F(1) = 47.22, p<.000; main effect type 
of demonstration, F(1) = 19.41, p<.000; affiliation x demonstration, .691, ns. Identification with organizers: main effect 
affiliation to organizers, F(1) = 521.35, p<.000; main effect type of demonstration, F(1) = 47.95, p<.000; affiliation x 
demonstration, F(1) = 9.58**. 
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austerity measures, we find that the former are far less likely to be a member of an organi-
zation that staged the demonstration. Nonmembers identify much less with the organizers of 
the demonstration and the other participants. If we separate members and nonmembers, we 
find participants in anti-state demonstrations identifying more with the organizers and less 
with the other participants in both subsamples. Furthermore, and as expected, participants in 
anti-state demonstrations are less likely to be instrumentally motivated and more likely to be 
expressively motivated.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this article we reported the results of a study of anti-austerity protests, comparing street 
demonstrations against anti-austerity measures taken by the government with street demon-
strations protesting the government taking these measures (Offe 2013). To fruitfully compare 
participants in the two types of demonstrations, we developed a theoretical framework based 
on the characterization of anti-measures demonstrations as particularistic and anti-state 
demonstrations as universalistic. We assumed that these two types of demonstrations attract 
different crowds. A basic factor differentiating the two crowds appeared to be their social 
embeddedness. Corroborating our theoretical framework, particularistic, anti-measure 
demonstrators are considerably more embedded in networks of the organizers than univer-
salistic, anti-state demonstrators. This embeddedness had important consequences. In terms of 
mobilization dynamics, we used Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012) distinction between col-
lective and connective action to hypothesize that anti-measures demonstrations are more 
likely to employ traditional organizational networks, while anti-state demonstrations are more 
likely to mobilize without organizations. Our findings confirmed this hypothesis. Further-
more, we assumed that the disparate degree of social embeddedness would result in different 
levels of identification, which again was confirmed. Anti-measures demonstrations reveal 
higher levels of identification with the organizers and the other participants. Identification 
patterns appeared to be moderated by affiliation to the organizers. Members of organizations 
that staged the demonstration identified significantly more with the organizers and the other 
participants than did nonmembers, irrespective of the demonstration they in which they par-
ticipated.  
Like Verhulst  (2011), we found that the motivational dynamics of particularistic and 
universalistic demonstrations diverge. Net of other factors, participants in anti-state demon-
strations were more expressively than instrumentally motivated, while participants in anti-
measures demonstrations were more instrumentally than expressively motivated. The claims 
of demonstrations against the austerity state are broadly framed in terms of blaming the state 
for its incapacity to deal with the financial crisis in a fair manner and challenging the 
legitimacy of the austerity state. Therefore, such demonstrations are especially appealing to 
citizens who feel that the state is violating their political values and principles. Demon-
strations opposing specific austerity measures, however, forward much narrower claims. They 
want the austerity measures that affect their situation to be cancelled, be it budget cuts, 
pension decreases, or raised registration fees, among others. The demonstration provides a 
way to communicate those claims to the politicians. Obviously, these demonstrations appeal 
to those who are affected by the measures being protested. They are not challenging the 
legitimacy of the state; instead, they want the state to redress the austerity measures. The 
distinction between these two types of protest is akin to the classical distinction made by 
Turner and Killian (1987) between power- and value-oriented movements. Van Stekelenburg 
(2006; see also van Stekelenburg et al. 2011) shows that power-oriented movements tend to 
appeal to instrumental motives, while value-oriented movements appeal to expressive 
motives, a finding we also confirmed. 
Clearly, the two types of demonstrations bring different crowds into the streets, which is 
especially interesting as both are reactions to austerity politics. Anti-state demonstrators were 







much more highly educated than anti-measures demonstrators. Moreover, among the anti-
state demonstrators, people occupied more precarious employment statuses. Indeed, a gener-
ation which in terms of education disposes of more resources than ever, is hit hard by the 
financial-economic crisis. More than anti-measures demonstrations, anti-state demonsrations 
were mobilizing the so-called precariat (Standing 2011).  
In line with their lower levels of embeddedness in the organizers’ networks, anti-state 
demonstrations more often than anti-measure demonstrations attract novices who are partici-
pating in a street demonstration for the first time in their lives. Compared to the “weathered 
demonstrators” who populate the anti-measures demonstrations, they are what Rüdig and 
Karyotis (2013a) call “apprentice demonstrators.” 
Anti-state demonstrators are more politicized than anti-measure demonstrators 
(Klandermans 2014). To be sure, each type of demonstrator is politically active, but partici-
pants in anti-state demonstrations engage in more political activities and discuss politics more 
frequently with their peers than participants in anti-measures demonstrations. In terms of 
political ideology, both types of demonstrator identify with the political left. In that sense our 
findings confirm Hutter’s (2014) findings that movement politics is predominantly a leftist 
affair. Of the two types of demonstrators, anti-state demonstrators were significantly less 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country.  
Our findings clearly indicate the relevance of the distinction between collective and 
connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). The qualification of a Facebook revolt is 
partially appropriate for anti-state protests. Nevertheless, mobilization without organization is 
too strong a statement. Obviously, a significant part of the mobilization process passed off via 
organizations also in the case of protest aiming at the austerity state.  
Let us now return to the question of whether the two types of demonstration are funda-
mentally different. Our study shows that they bring different people into the streets; the 
participants are differentially embedded in society, mobilized in a different manner, and 
differentially motivated. Yet, as mentioned above, they are all members of the left-libertarian 
family (Della Porta and Rucht 1995; Hutter 2014). Anti-measures demonstrators are much 
more embedded in movement organizations, which in our cases were mostly unions. In their 
mobilization campaigns these organizations are primarily reaching out to their own members 
and appealing to instrumental motives more than expressive ones. The composition of the 
anti-state demonstrations is much more heterogeneous, as the networks they are building on 
are more diverse; the organizers appeal to expressive motives rather than instrumental ones. 
The combination of education, employment status, social and political embeddedness, col-
lective and connective mobilization campaigns, dissatisfaction with democracy, identification, 
and motivation worked well in distinguishing between participants in the two types of 
demonstrations. The theory fit the data well, correctly classifying 75.6% of the cases. The 
composition of the crowds in the streets results from supply factors that are appealing to some 
people more than others. As we surveyed people in the act of protest, obviously, for these 
citizens the supply did fit a demand. Otherwise, they would not have taken part. Moreover, 
they were all demonstrations against austerity politics. Despite the commonalities, our study 
demonstrated that the people on the streets differed in a meaningful way, depending on 
whether people were fighting austerity measures or austerity states. 
The anti-austerity demonstrations we studied were a response to the financial and 
economic crisis that hit the Western world. When crises evolve, affected organizational fields 
mobilize and thus become organizing fields. Depending on the characteristics of these fields, 
these fields vary in the campaigns they stage and the constituencies to which they appeal. In 
the campaigns we studied, different aspects of the crisis were emphasized. We compared 
campaigns that framed the crisis as a financial/economic one with campaigns that framed the 
crisis as a political one. The former type (reacting to a financial/economic crisis) does not 
question the legitimacy of the government but protests against a specific austerity measure. 
These demonstrations appeal to a particular constituency, and thus we labeled these partic-
ularistic demonstrations. The latter type of demonstrations (reacting to a political crisis) 
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questions the legitimacy of the government while appealing to a wide constituency. 
Therefore, we labeled these demonstrations universalistic demonstrations. We argued that the 
two types of demonstration are fundamentally different, bringing widely diverging crowds 
onto the street.  
We theorized that the mobilizing fields differ for the two types of demonstrations. 
Borrowing from Bennett and Segerberg (2012), we made a distinction between connective 
action as evolving in “organizationally enabled networks” and collective action as evolving in 
“organizationally brokered networks” (p. 756). Depending on the structure of the mobilizing 
field, we expected the mobilization techniques to differ, and that is what we found. 
We also observed that particularistic demonstrations evoke higher levels of identification 
than do universalistic ones. Furthermore, both types of demonstrations evoke higher levels of 
identification with the other participants than with the organizers.  
Our study contributes a framework for the explanation of how specific demonstrations 
attract specific participants, with specific patterns of identification, specific motives, and with 
mobilization through different channels. Indeed, people were not distributed randomly 
between the two types of demonstrations, but through mechanisms that make some 
demonstrations more appealing to them than others. Hence, it is the organizing field and the 
way the crisis is framed in that field that determines who feels attracted, with what grievances 
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